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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
the "waiver" rule in the federal system.48
DisMissAL OF INDICTMENT FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION
After a delay of twenty-one months, (through no fault of their own) the
defendants made a motion pursuant to Section 668 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure to have the indictments against them dismissed for failure
to prosecute. In granting the motion the trial judge stated, "The facts are
such as to bring the matter squarely within the holding of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Prosser." The Appellate Division affirmed, 49 but on appeal the
order was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a four-three decision. 50
Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been
postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next
term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found
the court may, on application of the defendant, order the indictment
to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
The words of the statute make it evident that Section 668 confers a purely
discretionary power upon the court. It is because the power granted is one of
discretion that the problem in the case of People v. Alfonso arises.51
As stated earlier, the County Court based its decision on People v. Prosser.5
In that case the Grand Jury returned five indictments in 1946 against the
defendant. Soon after the defendant pleaded guilty to two of the indictments,
and was sentenced as a fourth felony offender, to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life. In 1952 the defendant was released from
prison, since he had been improperly sentenced as a fourth felony offender.
The District Attorney then re-arraigned the defendant on one of the three
indictments to which, six years before, he had pleaded not guilty. On that rearraignment he moved under Section 668 to dismiss for failure to prosecute
and because he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The County
Judge denied the motion and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate
Division affirmed the conviction. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that, as a matter of law, the defendant's motion to dismiss should
have been granted. A delay of six years was so great that the denial amounted
to an abuse of discretion by the County Judge. Since there was an untoward
delay of six years, without a waiver by defendant of his right to a speedy
non-included crime would place him twice in jeopardy, because he had been impliedly
acquitted of that crime.
The doctrine of "waiver" is concededly fictional. The Green case explores opposing
considerations concerning the waiver doctrine, and has been noted in over a dozen law
reviews.
48. Note the impact of the Green decision upon a state court, in People v. Gomez,
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trial, the trial judge should have granted defendant's motion and dismissed the
indictment.
When the Court in the case at bar proclaimed that it based its order of
dismissal on People v. Prosser,53 it was, in effect, granting the motion as a
matter of law and not as an exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals felt
that since the difference in the time element between the case at bar and the
4
Prosser case was so great, the former did not fit within the rule of Prosser.5
Rather, this was a situation in which the judge was to exercise his power as a
matter of discretion and not of law. Therefore, the decision of the lower
court and the Appellate Division was erroneous.
It is true that the Court appears, in form at least, to be making a highly
technical distinction. It can be said, as the dissent felt, that any order granted
under Section 668 is an exercise of discretion, because of the very nature of
the statute. As a result, the granting of the motion, regardless of the basis
for the grant, is an exercise of discretion and should be considered as such.
In substance the opinion of the Court results in the same conclusion as
reached by Judge Desmond in his dissent. It is now settled by this decision
that Section 668 is purely discretionary. The effect of Prosser is limited to
drawing a line which if reached, represents an abuse of discretion.55
IMmUNITY OF PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT FROM GRAND JURY INDICTMENT

In People v. Steuding5" the People appealed to the Court of Appeals
from an order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment of respondent by the Extraordinary Grand Jury investigating official
corruption in Ulster County. Respondent, a public official appearing pursuant
to a subpoena, was initially sworn and apprised of the fact that the Grand
Jury was not conferring any immunity upon him.57 He was also advised that
his testimony might be used against him and that he had the right to refuse to
answer any question that would tend to incriminate him.r" After being sworn
respondent executed a written waiver of any immunity or privilege concerning
questions asked relating to his official conduct, but refused to sign a general
waiver of immunity. The Grand Jury, ordered to disregard the testimony then
given by respondent, indicted him for conspiracy to bribe public officers and
of committing bribery.
The Court held that no statute conferring immunity could supersede the
constitutional right of a defendant or prospective defendant not to bear witness
against himself. His privilege was violated when he was called and examined
53. Ibid.
54. Supra note 52.

55. Supra note 52.
56. 6 N.Y.2d 214, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
57. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2447 purports to confer immunity upon a person only after
he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, and is then directed to answer the
questions asked. Section 2447 was enacted to replace § 2443, which provided complete
immunity at the outset of any proceeding.
58. N.Y. CoxsT., Art. I § 6; U.S. CoNsT., amend. V.
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